NASA Funding in Congress

Martin Machay, Alan Steinberg

NASA Funding in Congress

Číslo: 1/2020
Periodikum: European Journal of Business Science and Technology
DOI: 10.11118/ejobsat.2020.005

Klíčová slova: space policy, economic opportunism, legislative behavior, NASA, budgeting

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Anotace: This paper argues that individual members of Congress engage in economic opportunism, voting in the best interests of their constituents based on economic heuristics, when considering space policy legislation. Multivariable logit analysis is conducted on five votes in the House of Representatives to test the hypotheses. The economic opportunism effect is captured in the models by the presence of NASA Centers, relative importance of space industry and NASA procurements. Findings suggest that economic benefits to a member’s constituency can play an important role in legislative voting, particularly when legislation deals with federal aerospace funding, when space policy bills lack over-reaching bi-partisan support. In recent years the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has seen its funding fall prey to partisan budget battles and party line voting, but this was not historically the norm. As we move forward into a future where NASA funding may become more scrutinized and politicized, this paper supports the thesis that individual members of Congress care more about the funds for their constituents than the other aspects of space policy.